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Abstract
We introduce a joint model of labor market search and ﬁrm size dynamics to explain the
diﬀerential in labor market and productivity outcomes between the U.S. and the European
Union. At the core, our model is a hybrid of the labor market search model by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) and the model of the size distribution ﬁrms by Lucas (1978). Around this core,
however, we add several layers that we use to add rigidities that aﬀect the ‘ﬂexibility’ with which
resources are allocated in our model economy. The ﬁrst layer that we add is creative destruction.
That is, we relate the need for job reallocations to the growth rate of the economy. In each
period better ﬁrms enter while inferior ﬁrms exit, in the spirit of Jovanovic (1982). Hence,
contrary to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), exit of ﬁrms, and the destruction of the jobs that
they oﬀer, is thus endogenous in our model. The second layer that we add is the occupational
choice of workers that are without a job. That is, in equilibrium workers endogenously decide
whether to look for a job or to become an entrepreneur based on the quality of a business idea
that they have. The third layer is the dynamic hiring and ﬁring decisions of ﬁrms. Similar to
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), the ﬁrm dynamics in our model economy are in large part
driven by the dynamic hiring and ﬁring decisions made by the existing ﬁrms. We use this model
to identify which types of rigidities have the biggest distortionary eﬀect on the allocation of
resources both in terms of labor as well as in terms of productivity.
1 Introduction
We introduce a joint model of labor market search and ﬁrm size dynamics with many sources of
rigidities. This model jointly explains the diﬀerential in labor market and productivity outcomes
between the U.S. and the European Union.
1Diﬀerences in labor market outcomes between the E.U. and the U.S. account for the bulk of
per capita income diﬀerences between the U.S. and Europe. E.U. GDP per capita in 2002 was 73%
of that in the U.S.1. Of this 27% diﬀerence, 19% is due to diﬀerent labor market outcomes. Lower
labor force participation in Europe reduces E.U. per capita GDP by 6% relative to the U.S., while
higher unemployment reduces it by another 2%. The remainder of the 19% is due to European
workers working fewer hours than their American counterparts.
On the productivity side, Europe’s relative productivity level, in terms of output per hour
worked, increased from 77% of that of the U.S. in 1979 to 94% in 1994. However, it has since declined
to 85% (Gordon and Dew-Becker, 2005). Recent evidence on diﬀerences in ﬁrm size dynamics
between Europe and the U.S. gives a more detailed picture of the source of these productivity
disparities.
No matter whether the discussion is about labor markets or about productivity diﬀerentials
between Europe and the U.S., a lack of ﬂexibility in European labor and product markets is
often presented as the culprit for Europe’s dismal economic performance in the last decade. The
problem with this explanation is that the word ‘ﬂexibility’ is used in many diﬀerent contexts. As
a consequence, ‘ﬂexibility’ has become somewhat of an empty placeholder for everything that is
wrong with European economies.
In order to understand how labor and product market regulations aﬀect the ﬂexibility with
which resources are allocated and reallocated, we introduce a model of labor market search and
ﬁrm size dynamics in which we allow for a broad set of rigidities. We use this model to identify
which types of rigidities have the biggest distortionary eﬀect on the allocation of resources both in
terms of labor as well as in terms of productivity
At the core, our model is a hybrid of the labor market search model by Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) and the model of the size distribution ﬁrms by Lucas (1978). Around this core, however, we
add several layers that we use to add rigidities that aﬀect the ‘ﬂexibility’ with which resources are
allocated in our model economy.
The ﬁrst layer that we add is creative destruction. That is, we relate the need for job reallo-
cations to the growth rate of the economy. In each period better ﬁrms enter while inferior ﬁrms
exit, in the spirit of Jovanovic (1982). Hence, contrary to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), exit of
ﬁrms, and the destruction of the jobs that they oﬀer, is thus endogenous in our model.
1OECD National Accounts and Labor Force Statistics.
2The second layer that we add is the occupational choice of workers that are without a job.
That is, in equilibrium workers endogenously decide whether to look for a job or to become an
entrepreneur based on the quality of a business idea that they have.
The third layer is the dynamic hiring and ﬁring decisions of ﬁrms. Similar to Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), the ﬁrm dynamics in our model economy are in large part driven by the dynamic
hiring and ﬁring decisions made by the existing ﬁrms. These hiring and ﬁring decisions are dynamic
because ﬁxed costs for hiring and ﬁring imply that ﬁrms do not equate the marginal product of
labor to the real wage in each period, but instead expand and decrease their size only when the
marginal product of labor is substantially diﬀerent from the wage paid. In this sense, our model is
very similar to Bentolila and Bertola’s (1993) model of Eurosclerosis.
2 Model
2.1 Couch potato: Business plan aha-erlebniss
Let V CP













t (z,n) is the value at time t of being an entrepeneur that operates a ﬁrm at productivity
level z with n employees. The parameter ηt reﬂects the entrepeneur’s entry cost. V U
t is the value
of being unemployed and looking for a job in period t. The distribution FB
t (z) reﬂects the state of
technology in period t. It is the distribution from which business plans in period t are drawn.
2.2 Entrepeneur
The value at the beginning of time t of operating a business at productivity level zt and that is
of size nt−1 is determined by the optimal hiring decision. That is, the entrepreneur ﬁrst decides
on how many workers to hire or ﬁre and then produces output. Output per worker is assumed
to equal zt. The entrepreneur faces decreasing returns to scale through a per worker overhead
operating cost ct (zt,nt). The cost of changing its employment level from nt−1 to nt is given by
the hiring cost function, ht (nt,nt−1,zt). Productivity is subject to shocks that are reﬂect by the
conditional distribution Qz
t (zt+1 |zt). After the entrepreneur observes the productivity level for the
next period, he/she can decide to either stay in the market or exit and become a couch potato in
3the next period.
V E
t (zt,nt−1) = max
nt















Here wt (zt,nt) is the wage which is determined in a wage bargaining process explained in much
more detail below. τt denotes the taxes levied to pay for the unemployment beneﬁt. We include
these taxes to take into account the tax pressures on ﬁrms and workers in countries with more
extensive welfare programs. In the current version, we model these taxes as lump-sum on each job.
2.3 Unemployed individual
The way we determine the value of being unemployed is very similar to all the search models that
I do not know references to. The main diﬀerence is that, if the unemployed individual does not
get an oﬀer or not accept an oﬀer, at the beginning of the next period it will experience another
business plan aha-erlebniss. That is, its reservation level is determined by that value of being a
couch potato rather than of being unemployed in the next period. Let θt represent the ratio of
vacancies to unemployed individuals. Just like in Mortensen and Pissarides, we will assume that
the probability of getting a job oﬀer is θtq (θt). Furthermore, unemployed individuals are paid a
per period beneﬁt equal to bt.
The value of being unemployed can be written as
V U













+(1 − θtq (θt))
 







t (zt,nt) is the endogenously determined distribution of job oﬀers.
2.4 Worker
What remains in terms of value functions is the value of being employed in a ﬁrm that operates
at productivity level zt and of size nt. The ﬂow pay oﬀs for such a worker are the wage payments
in the current period, wt (zt,nt). What complicates this value is that there are two sides to this
match. A match can severed by both the ﬁrm as well as the worker. If either of the sides decides
to call it quits the match ends. Lay oﬀs occur randomly among workers in a ﬁrm. That is, if a ﬁrm
4decides to lay workers oﬀ, i.e. nt < nt−1. Then the probability of a worker being let go in period
t is (nt−1 − nt)/nt−1. Let νt (zt,nt−1) be the optimal ﬁrm size decision that follows from (2). We
will ﬁrst calculate the probability of being laid oﬀ at the beginning of next period, in a ﬁrm with
productivity level zt+1 and at a ﬁrm of size (before the hiring ﬁring decision) nt. This probability
is
(5) PF
t+1 (zt+1,nt) = I [νt+1 (zt+1,nt) < nt]
 
nt − νt+1 (zt+1,nt)
nt
 






























Note that this assumes that there is no on the job search. That is, to change jobs a worker ﬁrst
has to become a couch potato.
2.5 Wage bargaining
Wage bargaining is assumed to satisfy standard Nash bargaining principles. This requires us to
ﬁrst deﬁne the threat levels of the workers and the entrepreneur. Because, all workers are ex ante
the same we will assume that they will equally share their bargained part of the surplus. Both the
workers’ and the entrepreneur’s outside values are becoming a couch potato. Hence, the surplus
for the entrepreneur that manages a ﬁrm of productivity level zt and after the new size nt has been
realized equals
SE












t (zt+1 |zt) − V CP
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where 0 < β < 1
5Here β reﬂects the bargaining power of workers. This implies that the equilibrium wage satisﬁes













(11) (1 − β)SJ
t = βSE
t
The Nash-bargaining equilibrium wage wt (zt,nt) can be solved as






























































The matching technology that we assume is the same as in Mortensen and Pissarides (199?) and is
(13) q (θ) = θ1−α
2.7 Equilibrium dynamics
In every period we have to determine the size distribution of ﬁrms. How many workers get ﬁred,
leave their jobs. How many couch potatoes there are. How many unemployed individuals there
are. How many jobs are created. The job oﬀer distribution.
Let Φt (zt,nt) be the number of ﬁrms operating at productivity level zt and of size nt (after
hiring and ﬁring decision) in period t and let Φt be total number of ﬁrms at time t. Then
(14) Φt =
   
Φt (zt,nt)dztdnt
and let φt (zt,nt) = Φt (zt,nt)/Φt be the fraction of ﬁrms of productivity level zt and size nt. Then
the total number of workers is
(15) Nt =
   
Φt (zt,nt)ntdztdnt




   
φt (zt,nt)(ntzt − ct (zt,nt))dztdnt
6which is total value added produced divided by the number of workers and entrepreneurs. The size






The number of workers that get laid oﬀ equals
(18) NF
t =
   
Φt−1 (zt−1,nt−1)I [νt (zt,nt−1) < nt−1](nt−1 − νt (zt,nt−1))dntdQz
t−1 (zt |zt−1)
The number of jobs created in ﬁrms of type (zt,nt) is determined by ﬁrst identifying which types
of ﬁrms will end up hiring nt workers. Deﬁne the set

















t (zt,nt) = NC
t (zt,nt)/NC
t
In equilibrium there are no ﬁrms for which workers decide to leave and are then replaced by new
hires. This is because the new hires face the same marginal trade oﬀ as the workers that leave
and will thus make the same decision. This is a consequence of the no-on-the-job-search-decision
assumption.
We will assume that the government uses its current tax revenue generated through the τt’s to
ﬁnance next period’s unemployment beneﬁts. Everyone, including people who receive the unem-
ployment beneﬁts has to pay taxes. In that case, this condition is
(23) τt = (1 + r)bt+1 (1 − Nt+1 − Φt+1)
and can be plugged into the contraction mapping.
72.8 Hiring and ﬁring costs
2.9 Technological progress
We will include exogenous technological progress in this model by assuming some exogenously
moving technology frontier
(24) zt = z0 (1 + g)
t where 0 < g < r
where g is the exogenous growth rate of the technological frontier. In every period, zt reﬂects
the maximum productivity level of a ﬁrm at time t. That is, the support of the distributions of
productivity levels of business plans, i.e. FB
t (z), as well as of the transitional distribution for
existing ﬁrms, i.e. Qz
t (zt+1 |zt) for all zt, at time t is [0,zt].
In the rest of this paper, we express our whole model in a state variable for a ﬁrm that is its
productivity level relative to the frontier. Hence, for each ﬁrm, we write
(25) zt = ξtzt
and consider the evolution of ξt rather than zt.
The reason for this transformation is that this allows us to transform the value function equa-
tions into a system that is stationary for which we can deﬁne a proper steady state, i.e. a balanced
growth path in this case to be precise. To this stationary system, we can then apply our standard
solution methods. We detrend all value functions in the sense that
(26)   Vt =
Vt
zt
For the equation of the value function of the couch potato, this transformation yields
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  ηt =
ηt
zt
The distribution of business plan productivity levels, i.e.   FB
t (ξ), is now expressed in terms of their
productivity relative to the frontier.
The value of being an entrepreneur can now be expressed as
  V E
t (ξt,nt−1) = max
nt
 







  V E
t+1 (ξt+1,nt),   V CP
t+1
 
d   Qz
t (ξt+1 |ξt)
 
8while the value of being unemployed reads
  V U




  V J
t (zt,nt),  bt −   τt +
1 + g
1 + r





+(1 − θtq (θt))
 
  bt −   τt +
1 + g
1 + r




(30)   bt =
bt
zt
and   FO
t (ξt,nt) is the endogenously determined distribution of job oﬀers. The value of being in a
job reads
  V J
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t+1 (ξt+1,nt)   V CP
t+1 d   Qz
t (ξt+1 |ξt)
The wage bargaining process results in a wage that equals





































































The detrended version of the balanced budget constraint is
(31)   τt = (1 + g)(1 + r)  bt+1 (1 − Nt+1 − Φt+1)
So, the question is how we implement the solution method of this model. Our guess is to use a
contraction mapping approach. For this, we discretize the state space, such that
(32) ξt ∈ {0,x1,...,xr,1} = Ξ
and
(33) nt ∈ {0,l1,...,lq} = Λ
9This means that the state space consists of the cross-product of these two spaces, i.e. (ξt,nt)
consists of (r + 2)×(q + 1) points. All the decisions made in this economy depend on the following
unknown value functions
  V CP
t and   V U
t (34)
  V E
t : Ξ × Λ → R (35)
  V J
t : Ξ × Λ → R (36)
2.10 Calibration
The matching function and the bargaining power β are calibrated following Shimer (2005). Both α
and β are set to 0.72. (These numbers lie toward the upper end of the estimates.) g is set to 2.5%.
• Nt
Φt+Nt should be between 0.85 and 0.95. (Chang (2000) and Guner, Ventura, and Yi (2005))
• Job destruction rate (
NF
t
Nt ) is 8.4% (annual).
• Job creation rate (
NC
t
Nt ) is 8.3% (annual).
• Average ﬁrm size (
 
ntφn
t (nt)dnt) is around 15. (Guner, Ventura, and Yi (2005))
• 90% of total ﬁrms has less than 20 employees. (Nickell)
• Firm turnover rate (entry+exit) is around 20%.]
103 Lucas Model (1978)
As a baseline for the analysis of optimal ﬁrm size with rigidities, let’s put the Lucas (1978) model
into a dynamic setting and describe the steady state distribution of ﬁrm size.
As a condition for full employment in equilibrium, Lucas assumes that there are perfect labor
markets. Therefore, there are no forms of unemployment insurance here, and the value of being
unemployed in such an economy is zero, V U = 0. Accordingly, for a given level of productivity per
worker, the ﬁrm chooses the number of workers that maximizes its ﬂow of proﬁts at each period of
time.
We specify the cost function as c(n) = a·n2, and the proﬁt function as π(ξ) = n(ξ−w)−ξ·c(n),
where the ﬁrm faces decreasing returns to scale through c(n), or the ﬁrm’s per worker overhead
operating cost. Then the price taking, proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm will hire labor until the marginal
product of labor is equal to the wage. In order to obtain the optimal number of workers for a ﬁrm




[(ξ − w)n − ξ · c(n)] = 0
(ξ − w) − ξ · c′(n) = 0
(ξ − w) − ξ · (2an) = 0











if ξ > w













Next, Lucas assumes that entrepreneurs are selected from a probability distribution FB(ξ) :
R+ → [0,1], where ξ is the minimum managerial talent required in order to become an entrepreneur.
Thus, all agents with a draw less than ξ will be workers. In order to capture the dynamics of
entrepreneurial selection, we will make the further assumption that entrepreneurs face a conditional
probability distribution Qz(ξ′|ξ) that determines whether they will remain entrepreneurs in the next
period. For continuing ﬁrms (i.e. those with productivity draws ξ′ > ξ), Qz(ξ′|ξ) governs whether
the ﬁrm will face increased or decreased productivity. If the current entrepreneur observes some
productivity level ξ′ < ξ given their current productivity ξ, then they will become a worker and
their ﬁrm will exit the market. This suggests that ξ acts as a mechanism that regulates the entry
condition for ﬁrms. In equilibrium with continuous values of productivity growth and labor growth,
11then, an agent will be indiﬀerent between being a worker and being an entrepreneur that operates
with productivity ξ. To proceed, consider the continuous case, then consider the discrete case.
3.1 The Continuous Case
In order to formalize the entry condition, consider the value functions of the worker, V J, and the
entrepreneur, V E. In the current period, the worker obtains a ﬂow payoﬀ of the wage. After
observing his draw of managerial talent in the next period, he can decide whether to become an
entrepreneur with productivity ξt+1 or remain a worker. According to the entry condition, then,
we would ﬁnd that for productivity levels less than ξ the agent will remain a worker.
V J



















In the current period, the entrepreneur obtains his ﬂow of proﬁts. In the next period he observes
his productivity draw and decides whether he will become a worker or an entrepreneur with ﬁrm
productivity ξt+1. Also note the implicit assumption that entrepreneurs of existing ﬁrms must have
a greater value of continuing than becoming workers for at least one value of ξ, or else there are no
ﬁrms in equilibrium.
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With the speciﬁcation of these value functions, we are in a position to posit the entry condition as:
V E(ξ) = V J. Technically, in continuous space the probability that a random variable takes on a
particular value is zero, P(X = a) =
  a
a f(x)dx = 0. In order to solve this model we will look at
a discretization of the reals and specify a range of values that includes ξ. This is explored in the
next section.
Now we consider the steady state distribution of ﬁrms over productivity levels. Deﬁne Φ as
the number of ﬁrms (entrepreneurs) in the economy, and Φ(ξ) as the distribution of ﬁrms over
productivity levels. In equilibrium, the number of ﬁrms at a given level of productivity will be
composed of continuing ﬁrms according to the conditional distribution Qz(ξt+1|ξt) and entrants




Φ(ξt) dQz(ξt+1|ξt) + NFB(ξt+1)
Labor supply will be given by the fraction of agents that are not entrepreneurs:








Φ(ξt)n(ξt) dξ = N
3.2 The Discrete Case
In the discrete case, we take ξ and segment it into a grid. The equilibrium condition requires that
labor supply and demand are equal, as in (39). In order to check for this, given ξ and the implied
wage, we must solve for the ﬁrm productivity distribution, Φ(ξ). Notice that in discrete space, (37)
and (38) constitute a linear system, which we can solve as:

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   
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   
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To solve for the wage, take some ξ from the ξ-grid and set up the system of linear equations,
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Given the A(ξ) and B(w) matrices in the system, we can compute V = A−1(ξ) B(w) and then
exploit the free entry condition, V E(ξ) = V J, to back out the wage that brings the system into
equilibrium. To do this, we solve for the wage that satisﬁes:
(40)
[0 ... 0 1 0 ... 0 −1] A−1(ξ) B(w) = 0
↑
ξth
By substituting the optimal ﬁrm size decision n∗(ξ) into the entry condition, we see that for any ξ
on the grid, (40) will be decreasing in the wage,
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ξ

























− w + ψ = 0
Thus,






 2 + 4aξ(ψ − w) = 0 if ξ > w;
ψ − w = 0 if ξ < w.
where ψ is a constant corresponding to the third term in the second equation immediately above.
Since this is a non-linear system that is decreasing in the independent variable, we will use Newton-
Raphson approximation to obtain the equilibrium value of the wage for each threshold level, ξ.
14Because ξ is a portion of a discrete grid, satisfaction of the free entry condition implies a sum
of indiﬀerent agents that is greater than or equal to one. In the continuous case, there is only one
such “marginal manager.” Therefore we can consider two segmentations that divide agents into
workers and entrepreneurs:
(A) If ξ0 ≤ ξ, then the agent is a worker.
If ξ0 > ξ, then the agent is an entrepreneur.
(B) If ξ0 < ξ, then the agent is a worker.
If ξ0 ≥ ξ, then the agent is an entrepreneur.
where ξ0 is a given agent’s productivity draw in the grid. As stated, the idea is to assign all the
indiﬀerent agents to be either workers or entrepreneurs, respectively. Under each assignment we
can ﬁnd the solutions to the model. Since these assignments are extreme segmentations, we expect
that the “true” solutions are found within the interval established by these two limiting cases. For
large enough grids, we can ﬁnd adequately small solution intervals.
So, the steady state level of threshold productivity, ξ is found at the intersection of labor
supply and demand. But since labor supply increases when indiﬀerent agents become workers and
decreases when indiﬀerent agents become entrepreneurs, and since labor demand decreases when
indiﬀerent agents become workers and increases when indiﬀerent agents become entrepreneurs, the
segmentation of indiﬀerent agents along the lines of (A) and (B) imply diﬀerent levels of threshold
productivity. Additionally, if indiﬀerent agents become entrepreneurs, the distribution of ﬁrm
productivity is spread out over more existing ﬁrms than when indiﬀerent agents become workers.
3.3 Introducing Imperfect Labor Markets with Rigidities
Lucas (1978) has modelled an economy with perfect labor markets. In order to get at the question
of how diﬀerences in “ﬂexibility” aﬀect ﬁrm size across productivity levels, we wish to make several
augmentations to the Lucas framework. First, and most obviously, we wish to implant rigidities
into this economy in the form of taxation, hiring and ﬁring costs, unemployment beneﬁts, and entry
costs. We see immediately that (a) the value of employment is no longer zero, (b) with frictions in
the labor market there exists a job oﬀer distribution governing the transition from unemployment
to employment and vice-versa, and (c) ﬁrms will respond to productivity shocks by hiring and
ﬁring employees. Second, under the condition that the value of employment is non-zero, an agent
15no longer decides between two options: working or managing. In this case, the inclusion of an entry
cost requires an agent to obtain a business idea that he values more than staying unemployed. The
agent may wish take advantage of unemployment until he draws a management position from the
distribution of business ideas, FB(ξ). For this we will introduce another agent type that formalizes
this position.
3.4 Some Preliminary Results of the Dynamic Lucas Model
Parameters
Cost Parameter a 0.50
Population Mass 1.00
Steady State Labor Supply LS 0.69
Steady State Num. Firms 0.31
Steady State Wage w∗ 0.46
Steady State ξ Threshold ξ∗ 0.62
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